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Abstract of thesis presented to the Senate of Universiti Putra Malaysia in fulfilment of the 
requirement for the degree of Master of Science 
SHAREHOLDER GAINS DURING THE BANK MERGER 
ANNOUNCEMENTS IN MALAYSIA 
By 
LEE MIANG HUA 
July 2002 
Chairman: Associate Professor Dr. Muzafar Shah Habibullah, Ph.D. 
Faculty: Economics and Management 
This paper analyzes the shareholder gains surrounding the Malaysian bank merger 
announcements on 29th July 1999 and 14th February 2000. Initiated by the Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM) in the midst of financial crisis, the merger was not a market driven one 
in its real sense. In particular, this study measures the impact of these merger 
announcements on the appointed anchor bank, its target bank and combined bank. We 
find that all CARt are statistically insignificant at any conventional level regardless of the 
category during event window of 61-day and l l-day. We believe this is because these 
mergers are arranged by BNM and are not market driven. There are shareholder gains 
during the I I-day window for the combined bank category but the finding is not 
statistically significant. However, they show slight positive returns but not substantial 
during the 61-day window. We also find that the shorter periods ie. ll-day (-5,+5) would 
give higher level of CARt than longer periods ie. 61-day (-30,+30) in both initial and 
revised announcements. There are differences in CARt between the initial and revised 
announcements even though both announcements are arranged by BNM and involved the 
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same banks. We believe that the differences are mainly due to greater flexibility being 
given to banks on merger during the revised announcement. There are also differences in 
cumulative abnormal returns among the categories namely anchor bank, target bank and 
combined bank during the 61-day window but for the event window ll-day, our finding 
conclude that there is at least one category of CARt which is similar with the other 
categories. For both event windows of 61-day and ll-day, CARt have a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with the relative shareholders' funds of the anchor 
bank (SHR) and New Anchor bank (NEW), and inverse relationship with the relative size 
of anchor to target banks (ASSET). 
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Abstrak tesis yang dikemukakan kepada Senat Universiti Putra Malaysia 
sebagai memenuhi keperluan untuk ijazah Master Sains 
KEUNTUNGAN PEMEGANG SAHAM SEMASA PENGUMUMAN 
PENGGABUANGAN BANK-BANK DI MALAYSIA 
Oleh 
LEE MIANG HUA 
Julai 2002 
Pengerusi: Profesor Madya Dr. Muzafar Shah Habibullah, Ph.D. 
Fakulti: Ekonomi and Pengurusan 
Tujuan tesis in adalah untuk menganalisis keuntungan pihak pemegang saham semasa 
pengumuman penggabungan bank-bank pada 29hb lulai 1999 and 14hb Februari 2000 di 
Malaysia. Disebabkan penggabungan ini adalah dianjurkan oleh Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) semasa krisis kewangan, ia tidak boleh dianggap sebagai penggabungan yang 
didorong oleh faktor-faktor pasaran bebas dalam erti kata yang sebenar Secara khusus, 
tujuan tesis ini adalah untuk mengukur kesan pengumuman penggabungan terhadap bank 
induk yang dilantik, bank sasaran and bank tergabuag. Kajian ini mendapati bahawa 
semua CARt tidak mencapai taraf keertian yang tinggi dalam tempoh jendela peristiwa 61 
hari dan 11 hari. Ini adalah kerana penggabuangan bank-bank ini adalah diatur oleh BNM 
dan bukan didorong oleh pasaran bebas. Kami mendapati ada keuntungan bagi pihak 
pemegang saham dalam tempoh l l-hari tetapi keuntungan bagi tempoh 61-hari tidak 
tinggi. Kami juga mendapati bahawa CARt adalah lebih tinggi bagi tempoh yang lebih 
pendek seperti tempoh 11hari. Tesis in juga mendapati bahawa ada perbezaan antaran 
pengumuman awal and pengumuman kedua disebabkan pertukaran syarat dalam 
pengumuman kedua. Terdapat juga perbezaan dalam pUlangan tidak normal terkumpul di 
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kalangan kategori-ketegori berkenaan iaitu bank peneraju, bank sasaran dan bank 
tergabung dalam jendala 61-hari tetapi bagi jendala peristiwa l l-hari\, kajian ini 
merumuskan bahawa terdapat sekurang-kurangnya satu kategori CARt yang serupa 
dengan ketegori yang lain, Bagi kedua-dua jendela peristiwa 61-hari and l l-hari, CARt 
mempunyai perkaitan positif dan signifikan dari segi statistik dengan dana pemegang 
saham bank peneraju (SHR) dan bank peneraju baru (NEW) dan perkaitan songsang 
dengan saiz bank peneraju berbanding saiz bank sasaran (ASSET) 
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1.1 Background 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For some time now, Malaysia has been preparing for the day when the barriers to entry 
will come down with the enforcement of World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Asean 
Free Trade Area (Mta) liberalization rules. To further prepare itself for this challenge, the 
Malaysian government has taken steps to strengthen the local financial institutions 
through merger and consolidation of the financial industry. In normal circumstances, 
merger is a market driven process, which involve willing seller and willing buyer. 
However, the Malaysian bank merger was initiated by the two most powerful regulatory 
authorities in their respective jurisdictions, which are Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) and 
Securities Commission (SC). 
This industry-wide merger exercise which took place in year 1999-2000 has created an 
intensive wave of mergers that shook out the local banking sector and forever changed 
the country's  landscape. As a result, by 31st December 2000, 50 of the country 's 54 
financial institutions had been trimmed to just 10 banking groups in the space of a few 
short months. BNM reported that 94% of the total assets of the domestic banking sector 
have rationalised and consolidated. 
In general, mergers among the financial institutions have been a global trend in recent 
years due to the effects of the on-going process of globalisation and liberalisation. 
Recently, Japanese banks have merged and created among themselves four mega-banks, 
17 
which are Mizuho Financial Group, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, The 
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group and the UFJ Group. The creation of Mizuho Financial 
Group, through the merger between Dai !chi Kangyo Bank, Industrial Bank of Japan and 
Fuji Bank, has put the Group as the world largest bank in term of assets. (Business 
Times, 3rd April 2001) In another development, the region biggest bank, Development 
Bank of Singapore (DBS) has acquired Dao Heng Bank in Hong Kong for around 
USD5.7 billion to make its presence felt in Hong Kong. All these recent mergers are part 
of the individual bank's preparation for the globalization and liberalization. 
In fact, this research is motivated by the significant increase in merger activities 
internationally as well as locally. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effects of 
the bank mergers' announcements towards the shareholder gains of the banks involved in 
the merger. Particularly, we would like to find out whether these announcements would 
create value or abnormal returns on banks that involved in the merger announcements on 
29th July 1999 and 14th February 2000, including separating the effects on anchor banks 
and the target banks. 
1.2 Development in the Banking Industry Prior to the Merger 
1.2.1 Significant Events Prior to the Merger 
Years prior to the industrial wide merger, the banking industry had gone through some 
degree of rationalization beginning with the banking sector reforms initiated after the 
1985-86 recession that necessitated the injection of capital into three ailing commercial 
banks by BNM. One of the banks, United Asia Bank Bhd, was subsequently merged with 
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Bank of Commerce (M) Bhd that allowed BNM to divest its entire shareholding in the 
bank. The more competitive environment and the need to increase capital base have 
prompted two subsequent mergers in the industry. The first was between DCB Bank Bhd 
and Kwong Yik Bank Bhd in 1997, which gave birth to RHB Bank Bhd and the second 
merger, was between Chung Khiaw Bank Bhd and United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd also 
in 1997. 
Unfortunately, the pace of mergers in the banking industry remained slow and 
unsatisfactory throughout the 1990s. However, the financial crisis in 1997-98 gave the 
much-needed push for the industry to consolidate and in June 1999, RHB Bank Bhd 
absorbed Sime Bank Bhd while Bank of Commerce (M) Bhd merged with Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd in October 1999. 
With the aim of rebuilding and strengthening the balance sheets of the commercial banks, 
prudential reforms were introduced. The most significant was the implementation of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy framework in 1989 which 
replaced the minimum 'free ' capital adequacy ratio requirement. The new capital 
standard requires capital to be provided for both on- and off-balance sheet assets based on 
their perceived level of counterparty risk. This capital-asset relationship will ensure that 
these elements move in tandem such that any increase in risky assets would be supported 
by an increase in the required level of capital. This approach effectively increases the risk 
sensitivity of the commercial banks in the structuring of their balance sheet. The new 
capital adequacy framework also saw the concept of bank holding companies being used 
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to reorganize bank groups in order to improve the Risk Weighted Capital ratio (RWCR) 
of the commercial banks. Under the RWCR framework, investments in subsidiaries are 
deducted from the capital base of the parent banks, thereby reducing their RWCR. Thus, 
a bank holding company allows the bank to divest its subsidiaries to the holding 
company, freeing its capital for greater loan asset expansion. 
A major regulatory and legislative milestone also took place in 1989 with the enactment 
of the Banking and Financial Institution Act 1989 (BAFIA) which replacing the Banking 
Act 1973 and Finance Companies Act 1969. The introduction of BAFIA was intended to 
provide an integrated supervision of the Malaysian financial institutions and to modernise 
and streamline the laws relating to banking and all other financial institutions came under 
one supervisory body. Over time, growing competition in the banking system had 
resulted in the blurring of demarcation of business lines between the three traditional 
groups of banking institutions under BNM's supervision, namely commercial banks, 
merchant banks and finance companies. This had led to a convergence on the 
methodology of supervision of these institutions though the enactment of BAFIA, 
including discount houses and money brokers, which were previously supervised on an 
administrative basis, under one common legal supervisory framework. 
BNM also introduce the two-tier regulatory system (TTRS) for the commercial banks in 
1994, with the objective of accelerating the pace of liberalization for strong and healthy 
institutions. The TTSR provided the impetus for the emergence of a core of well­
managed and highly capitalized commercial banks, which would be able to grasp 
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opportunities for innovation and face greater competition in light of financial 
globalization and liberalization. The system permitted well-managed banking institutions 
with strong financial standing to carry out specific new activities and conduct certain 
aspects of their operations under a more liberal regulatory environment. To qualify for 
Tier-1 status, commercial bank were required to meet minimum shareholders' funds of 
RM500 million by end 1995, which would then be increased to RM1 billion by end 2000. 
In addition, they were also required to achieve a strong rating under the CAMEL 
framework which evaluated five critical components of banking operations i.e.: capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management capacity, earnings performance and liquidity 
position. A total of 1 1  commercial banks qualified for the Tier-1 status by end 1996. 
The TTRS had a significant impact on the balance sheet of commercial banks as could be 
seen in the substantial growth of the commercial banks' capital and reserve from RMlO 
billion at end 1993 to RM25.2 billion at end 1996, due largely to new capital injection. 
Pressed on the need to generate high rates of return for the new capital, there was also a 
significant rise on the asset side of commercial banks' balance sheets, particularly on 
loans extended and holdings of marketable securities which almost doubled from RM117 
billion and RM26.8 billion to RM217.8 billion and RM51 billion respectively within 
1993 to 1996. The TTRS was eventually abolished in 1999 due to its negative impact of 
inducing aspiring banking institutions to increase their asset base in a rapid manner to 
keep up with the required earnings on capital. The financial crisis in 1997-98 showed that 
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the asset quality of banks was affected as a result of the pressure to record rapid loan 
growth. 
1.2.2 Progress in the Banking Industry Prior to the Merger 
The commercial banks are the main players in the banking system. They are the largest 
and most significant providers of funds in the banking system with total loans and total 
deposits amounting to RM285. 1  billion and RM287.6 billion respectively as at end June 
1999, representing approximately 76% and 71% of the banking system's total loans and 
deposits respectively. 
As at end June 1999, there are 34 commercial banks (excluding Bank Islam Malaysia 
Bhd) operating with a total of 1,735 branches nation wide, of which 13 are locally 
incorporated foreign banks. There are approximately 63,889 staff employed by the 
commercial banks in the country, an increase of about 53.6% since 1988. 
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Table 1.1: Commercial Banks in Malaysia - Malaysian Banks (RM million) 
Name of Bank 
1. Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad • 
2. Ban Hin Lee Bank Berhad 
3. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad 2 
4. Bank of Commerce (M) Berhad 
5 .  Bank Utama (M) Berhad 
6. BSN Commercial �M) Berhad4 
7. EON Bank Berhad 
8. Hock Hua Bank 
9. Hong Leong Bank Berhad6 
10. International Bank Malaysia Berhad7 
11 .  Malayan Bank Berhad 
12. Multi-Purpose Bank Berhad8 
13. Oriental Bank Berhad 
14. Perwira Affin Bank Berhad 
15. Phil eo Allied Bank Bank (M) Berhad9 
16. Public Bank Berhad 
17. RHB Bank BerhdlO 
18. Sabah Bank Berhad 
19. Southern Bank Berhad 
20. The Pacific Bank Berhad 
21. Wah Tat Bank Berhad 
22. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
Source. Bank Negara MalaYSia 
Year of 
commencement 
of business in 
Malaysia 
1957 
1935 
1966 
1973 
1976 
1975 
1964 
1951 
1923 
1961 
1960 
1957 
1937 
1976 
1966 
1966 
1965 
1979 
1965 
1922 
1955 
1983 
Formerly known as Security Pacific Asian Bank Limited prior to 1994. 
Total assets as 
at end 
financial year 
1998/1999 
(RM million) 
12,614.60 
6,820.80 
38,164.70 
20,382.70 
7,140.90 
6,565.70 
9,149.00 
4,934.60 
15,094.50 
969.00 
77,896.00 
7,658.50 
8,866.70 
15,343.10 
10,605.80 
31,581.90 
5 1,285.20 
2,670.10 
8,193.10 
10,955.70 
724.70 
5,698.40 
The conventional (non-Islamic) assets and liabilities of the bank had been transferred to the newly merged Bumiputra­
Commerce Bank, which began operation in 1 October 1999. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad remainsjnvolved exclusively in 
the Islamic banking sector under the name of Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad. 
\0 
Bank of Commerce Berhad (BCB) and United Asian Bank Berhad (UAB) were merged in 1991. UAB's name was changed to 
Bank of Commerce (M) Berhad while the banking license of BCB was surrendered. On 1 October 1999, the bank was renamed 
Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Berhad following the absorption of the conventional (non-Islamic) assets and liabilities of Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad. 
Formerly known as Bank Buruh (M) Berhad prior to 1995. 
Formerly known as Kong Ming Bank Berhad prior to 1992. Formerly known as MUI Bank Berhad prior to 1994. 
Formerly known as Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Berhad prior to 1997. 
Formerly known as Malaysian French Bank Berhad prior to 1996. Formerly known as United Overseas Bank Limited prior to 1994 and AlliedBank (M) Berhad prior to 1997. 
Kwong Yik Bank Berhad and DCB Bank Berhad (DeB) were merged in 1997, after which DCB was renamed as RHB Bank 
Berhad. 
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Table 1.2: Commercial Banks in Malaysia - Foreign Banks (RM million) 
Total assets 
Year of as at end 
commencement financial 
of business in year 
Malaysia 1998/1999 
Name of Bank (RM million) 
1 ABN AMRO Bank Berhad 1888 1,830.50 
2 Bangkok Bank Berhad 1959 699.90 
3 Bank of America Malaysia Berhad 1959 1,597.00 
4 Bank ofTokyo-Mitsubitshi (M) 
Berhad 1959 2,711.70 
5 Citibank Berhad 1959 13,719.50 
6 Deutsche Bank (M) Berhad 1968 1 ,879.80 
7 HSBC Bank (M) Berhad 1884 25,187.30 
8 OCBC Bank (M) Berhad 1932 15,882.40 
9 Overseas Union Bank (M) Berhad 1958 6,460.40 
10 Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia 
Berhad 1875 17,009.10 
11  The Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad 1973 1,261 .10 
12 The Chase Manhattan Bank (M) 
Berhad 1973 1 ,261 .10 
13 United Overseas Bank (M) Berhadll 1956 10,91 1 .60 
Source: Bank Negara MalaYSia 
11 Formerly known as Lee Wah Bank Limited prior to 1994. Chung Khiaw Bank (M) Berhad merged with United Overseas Bank 
(M) Berhad in 1997. 
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